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The angry demonstrators on the streets of Bishkek, and elsewhere in Kyrgyzstan, this 
week were pushed too far by the corrupt and greedy thugs who had run the country since 
2005. By raising the fees for utilities, cell phones and the like the government of 
President Kurambek Bakiev sought to squeeze even more money out of the largely 
impoverished people of Kyrgyzstan, but the people showed that they had a breaking point. 
The upheaval was somewhat violent, and is not yet over, but it could have been a lot 
worse if the security forces had been loyal to the defeated Bakiev regime and been more 
willing to defend him. 
Bakiev came to power almost exactly five years ago in a similar semi-violent set of street 
demonstrations that, largely because the demonstrations were precipitated by a fraudulent 
election and occurred shortly after similar but nonviolent transitions in Georgia and 
Ukraine, was viewed a Color Revolution and, like the Rose and Orange Revolution, was 
named after a plant and called the Tulip Revolution. 
It is not clear how events will conclude in Kyrgyzstan. The interim government is 
currently led by Roza Otunbayeva, a longtime Kyrgyz diplomat and politician who, like 
most of the other leaders of these demonstrations, is also a disillusioned Tulip 
Revolutionary. Otunbayeva may seek to place Kyrygysztan on a path to democracy 
beginning with new elections sometime in the next few months; the new leadership may 
move towards a stronger but equally undemocratic regime; the new leaders may simply 
replace Bakiev and his family as the new top thugs in town; or any number of other 
outcomes could occur too. 
Regardless of how events play out in Kyrgyzstan, it is now clear that U.S. policy there in 
recent years has been misguided. The U.S. allowed itself to be manipulated into 
supporting a government that was not only corrupt and undemocratic but also weak and 
incompetent because of the strong need to have access to the Manas Air Force Base 
which is only a few miles from Bishkek. It is worth noting that the U.S. had to provide 
Bakiev thugocracy a contract worth roughly $180 million, in the form of loans, grants 
and contracts, all of which was looted by the ruling clique, in exchange for access to the 
base. 
The Manas Air Force Base plays a key role in transporting troops and materials to 
support the U.S. led effort in Afghanistan, so the U.S. was forced to accede to the 
demands of the Bakiev regime in exchange for access to the base. The U.S. largely 
overlooked the ample shortcomings of this key Central Asian regime because of the base. 
The failure of the U.S. to speak out against the increasingly authoritarian Kyrgyz 
government was not lost on the beleaguered opposition-the same beleaguered opposition 
which is currently running the country. 
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For the U.S. one key question will be whether or not the new government will allow 
continued use of the Manas Air Force Base. The initial indications are that the interim 
government will allow this access. In this regard the U.S. may have gotten lucky, because 
U.S. support for Bakiev could have made the opposition, which is now in power, more 
hostile to the U.S. Nonetheless, continued base access will almost certainly require new 
contracts either in the form of genuine assistance or money with which the new leaders 
can line their pockets, as Bakiev and his cronies lined theirs. 
A less myopic question on which American policy makers would also do well to focus is 
how to build relationships with regimes that have valuable resources, or strategic 
locations, but are neither free nor stable. The biggest analytical flaw in the U.S. approach 
to Kyrygzstan was not the willingness to support an undemocratic regime. This is 
sometimes necessary in a complex and often dangerous world. The real flaw with 
American thinking was a willingness to overlook the obvious signs of instability in the 
old Kyrgyz regime, almost taking the lack of democracy as some kind of evidence of 
government ability or state strength. While realists are fond of reminding us that 
democratic regimes are often unstable, Kyrgyzstan is just further proof of the rather 
obvious point that undemocratic regimes are often unstable too. 
